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In this paper, we provide a comprehensive investigation of 260 initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in the Australian resource sector for the 1994 – 2004 period. Consistent with the 
existing IPO literature, we document a 16.13% underpricing return by firms in the 
sample. Despite the contention that risk management can reduce the uncertainty relating 
to the new issue and hence alleviates the extent of underpricing, we do not find any 
evidence in support of such contention. In addition to the conventional variables used to 
explain IPOs underpricing, we further provide evidence that the demand for resources 
IPOs is not ‘crowded-out’ by the strength of alternative IPO markets. We also show 
evidence that the issue price adjusts to both market return in preceding months and the 
average underpricing of resources IPOs in the 12 month period leading to the float which 
offers an explanation to the hot issue effect observed in the IPO market.  
 
Keywords: initial public offerings, underpricing, risk management, crowding-out effect, 
hot issue market.  
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  21.  Introduction 
 
Underpricing, the extent to which the issuing price is less than the market price on the 
first day of trading for initial public offerings (IPOs,) is an internationally pervasive 
phenomenon. Despite evidence that one issue mechanism may be more efficient than 
others in controlling underpricing,
1 Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) report 
underpricing in all 25 countries included in their study. Studies in the Australian IPO 
market have also documented significant underpricing. A 29.2% underpricing return was 
reported for earlier IPOs in the period between 1966 and 1978 (Finn and Higham 1988) 
while later IPOs were underpriced in the region between 11.9% (Lee, Taylor and Walter 
1996) and 16.46% (How, Izan and Monroe 1995). Nevertheless, as commented by How 
(2000), a majority of these studies focused on industrial firms which appears to be a 
paradox given the increasingly important role of the resources sector in the Australian 
financial market. As of June 2007, resources-based companies account for 37.5% of all 
listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).
2 By the same token, for the 
six months leading up to June 2007, of all IPOs registered with the ASX, approximately 
60% are resources based companies.
3
 
Previously, How (2000) reports a substantial 119.51% underpricing on average for a 
sample of 130 resources firms in Australia from 1979-1990. This exceptionally high 
underpricing return is, however, largely attributable to the “hot” IPO market of the late 
1980s that was characterized by high volume of IPO activities and large underpricing 
returns. Prior to this hot IPO market, underpricing return was reported at 27.06% which is 
more in line with recent evidence provided by Dimovski and Brooks (2006) of a 13.3% 
first day return in a sample of 114 gold IPOs. 
 
A number of theories have been advanced to explain underpricing. In his widely cited 
article, Rock (1986) argues that underpricing is necessary to compensate ‘uninformed’ 
                                                 
1 Derrien and Womack (2003) show that the auction method of IPO used widely in some European 
countries is directly related to a lower degree of underpricing compared to the book-build mechanism 
heavily relied upon in the US IPO market.  
2 See www.asx.com.au for more detail.  
3 For the first 6 months of 2007, there are 116 IPOs registered with the ASX of which 69 companies belong 
to the energy, metals and mining sectors. See www.connect4.com.au for more detail.  
  3investors for participating in lower quality issues due to information asymmetry and to 
induce them to invest in future issues. Information asymmetry is also the tenet of Allen 
and Faulhaber’s (1989) argument that high quality IPO companies ‘signal’ to the market 
their quality by underpricing the issue. These IPO issuers can then recoup the cost of 
underpricing through subsequent seasoned issues. The information extraction model 
developed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) posits that institutional investors have private 
information about the value of IPO shares and as a result the issuers have to incur a cost 
in the form of underpricing to extract these private information. This model is, however, 
specific to the book building mechanism used in US IPOs where the underwriters set the 
issue price after a ‘road-show’ period during which institutional investors tentatively 
express their demands for the shares. In contrast, the fixed-price issue mechanism, used 
in Australia and some European countries, is subject to informational cascades. In 
particular, Welch (1992) shows that when an IPO is offered sequentially, investors form 
an informed opinion regarding the value of the issue based on their observation of the 
decision made by previous investors. As a result, issuers are forced to set a price, likely to 
be lower than what they believe the true worth of the shares is, to attract the first investor 
and hence create a positive informational cascade. Empirical evidence has provided a 
moderate degree of support to these theories. In particular, higher underpricing is found 
in smaller issues (Beatty and Ritter 1986), younger firms (Ritter 1984), IPOs with lower 
offer price (Bradley et al 2006), IPOs that employ lower quality underwriters (Corwin 
and Schultz 2005) and lower quality auditors (Beatty 1989), IPOs that do not have 
existing banking relationship (Schenone 2004) and IPOs with low earning potential 
(Koop and Li 2003).   
 
Our paper extends the previous literature on resources IPOs by providing a 
comprehensive examination of 260 resources IPOs during the 1994-2004 period. Our 
exhaustive dataset allows us to provide a more complete picture than has been done in the 
past regarding the resources IPO market in Australia. There have also been major 
changes in the legislative and institutional environment in the last decade that warrant an 
updated investigation of the resources IPO market. In addition we advance and 
  4empirically test for alternative theories that can potentially explain underpricing. They 
are: (i) risk management, (ii) crowding out effect and (iii) hot issue effect.  
 
While there is no definite answer as to what causes underpricing, it is the general 
consensus that underpricing reflects the uncertainty relating to the true value of the IPO 
shares and to the long-term viability of the company. These sources of uncertainty are 
obviously inherent in all new issues. Nevertheless, Australian resources-based companies 
are particularly exposed to two major types of financial risks: commodity price risk and 
exchange rate risk. The resources sector in Australia is a world’s leader in the production 
of a variety of commodities including coal, iron ore, crude oil, gold, silver, copper, 
diamond and natural gas.
4 The prices of these commodities are determined by global 
demand and supply and as such have displayed a high degree of volatility over time. As a 
result, the revenue of a resources firm can be adversely affected by global economic and 
social factors resulting in fluctuations in world commodity price. Additionally, 
commodity prices, more often than not, are denominated in USD which further exposes 
these firms to exchange rate risk. Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2002) argued that managers 
hedge to reduce the noise associated with fluctuations in exchange rate, interest rate and 
commodity price that are beyond the manager’s control. To that effect, hedging can be 
used to reduce the asymmetric information relating to managerial ability and firm value. 
As a result, we hypothesize that by prudently managing these risks issuing firms can 
partially reduce the information asymmetry relating to the value of the shares and its 
future performance. Consequently, risk management should be associated with a lower 
degree of underpricing.  
 
The second hypothesis that we aim to test empirically in this paper is whether IPOs in 
other sectors ‘crowd-out’ IPOs in the resources sector and consequently resources issuers 
are forced to underprice their issues to compete. In other words, we aim to investigate the 
degree to which different IPOs markets are segmented and whether investors’ decision to 
                                                 
4 Australia is the world’s leading producer of lead, bauxite, diamonds, rutile, zircon and tantalum. It is the 
second largest supplier of uranium, zinc and nickel; the third biggest provider of iron ore, lignite, silver, 
manganese and gold; and the fourth largest producer of black coal and copper. See Maslen (2006) for more 
detail. 
 
  5invest in the resources sector is made independently of or in conjunction with investment 
opportunities available in alternative IPO markets. If resources IPOs’ clientele exhibit 
loyalty and make their investment decisions independent of alternative investment 
opportunities then we would expect to see no relationship between the degree of 
underpricing in alternative IPOs markets and the extent of underpricing in resources 
IPOs. On the other hand, if the aggregate demand for IPOs is derived from a common 
pool of funds, the strength of alternative IPO markets may ‘crowd out’ the demand for 
resources IPOs and as such a positive relationship is expected between the underpricing 
observed in resources IPOs and alternative IPOs. To empirically test this hypothesis we 
employ data from two alternative IPO industry sectors being the Telecommunication and 
Health Care and Pharmaceuticals sectors. These two sectors are chosen as, like the 
resources sector, they are relatively speculative in nature. As a result, investors that have 
an appetite for the risk inherent in investments in resources IPOs are likely to be attracted 
to investments in Telecommunication and Health Care and Pharmaceuticals IPOs.  
 
Finally, we provide a direct test for the ‘hot issue’ effect. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and 
Ritter (1984) define a hot IPO market as one which is characterized by high IPO volumes 
and high level of first day return, or underpricing. In a hot market, firms take a shorter 
time to list and also leave a larger amount of money on the table.
5 Derrien (2005), for 
example, comments that for the two year period between 1999 and 2000, 803 companies 
went public in the United States and in doing so they left $62 billion on the table, which 
is approximately 50% of the amount of capital sought. A hot resources IPO market was 
also witnessed in Australia before the 1987 crash. How (2000) reports that in the two year 
period before the crash, 94 companies went public compared with only 24 in the 6 year 
period before. On average, these IPOs produced a 133.55% first day return to investors 
which, given the average issue size of $544.87mil, is equivalent to $727.74mil being left 
on the table. A recent strand of literature has focused on these hot issue periods and the 
economic impact of the huge amount of money left on the table. The dynamic 
information acquisition model advanced by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggests that 
                                                 
5 Money left on the table is an alternative measure of underpricing. The amount of money left on the table 
is calculated as the difference between the amount raised at the issue price and the amount that could have 
been raised at the first trading day price.  
  6the issue price is adjusted in response to the private information extracted from 
institutional investors during the book building period. Nevertheless, the existence of 
‘hot’ markets indicates that not only does the issue price adjust to private information but 
it also adjusts to public information being the market return. The partial adjustment to 
public information has been confirmed empirically by Derrien and Wormack (2003) who 
find that the initial returns can be explained by the market returns in the 3 month period 
preceding the issue. Loughran and Ritter (2002) similarly develop a prospect theory that 
explains price adjustment to both private and public information. They find that only one 
third of the public information, that is market returns, is incorporated into the issue price 
and conclude that due to this price adjustment process ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets will be 
present as long as the book building approach continues to be used. While these models 
cannot be applied directly in the context of Australia given the differing mechanisms 
used to issue shares to the public, it can be argued that although private information can 
not be extracted in a fixed price issue mechanism the issuing company, in conjunction 
with the underwriters where applicable, will set an issue price taking into account public 
information about market returns and the returns of previous IPO issues. In other words, 
while the price adjustment to private information is absent in a fixed price issuing 
mechanism since the issuers do not have an opportunity to gauge the interest of 
institutional investors, the issue price should follow a partial adjustment process to public 
information. As a result, we expect a positive correlation between an IPO’s underpricing 
and previous IPOs’ underpricing and market return in the period leading up to the float, 
respectively.  
 
Our findings show that, of the 260 resources IPOs that went public in the 1994 – 2004 
period, the average underpricing is 16.13%. These IPOs in total raised A$5,024,100,472 
and in the process left A$97,804,734.45, or approximately 1.95% of the capital sought, 
on the table. It is also of interest to note that underpricing is only evidenced in 58.85% of 
these issues, 8.46% of firms actually had a first day closing price equal to their issue price  
and the remaining 32.69% of IPOs managed to overprice their issue. Second, we find no 
evidence that the firm’s intention to use different hedging techniques to manage financial 
risks and their actual usage in the year following the listing have an alleviating impact on 
  7the extent of underpricing. It appears that risk management, intentional or actual, is not a 
sufficiently credible signal to alleviate the uncertainty relating to a new issue. Third, the 
presence of investment opportunities in the Health and Pharmaceuticals and 
Telecommunications IPO market does not affect the degree of underpricing in the 
resources IPO market. This finding supports our hypothesis that these IPOs markets are 
segmented and the decision to invest in one market is made independently of the decision 
to invest in another. Finally, we find strong evidence that the issue price adjusts to public 
information, namely, initial returns on previous IPOs and market returns in the period 
leading up to the float. Our findings are consistent with that of Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) which explain the cyclical pattern in the behaviour of IPO markets.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss our data 
and methodology. Our results are discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 finally concludes.  
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
 
Our sample consists of 260 resources IPOs in Australia between 1994 and 2004. Details 
about these IPOs were obtained by a manual examination of the prospectuses as recorded 
by Connect4. Market price data such as the closing prices on the first day of trading and 
market indices are downloaded from Bloomberg.  
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides a breakdown of these IPOs by year and by sub-industry 
groups. As is evident from Panel A of Table 1, the volume of resources IPOs fluctuates 
rather widely over time. The ‘coldest’ IPO period observed in our sampling period is 
between 1998 and 1999 which coincided with the onset of the downturn of the stock 
market in general. However, IPO activities picked up from 2000 and have since showed 
steady strength. The number of IPOs peaked in 2004 with 62 IPOs in total compared with 
40 IPOs the year before and only 2 IPOs in 1999. The strength of the market in 2004 is 
evident across the board. In 2004, except for the Gold sector, all other resources sector 
record the highest level of IPO activities since 1994. Other Metals is the largest 
contributor to the overall resources IPO volume accounting for almost half of the IPOs in 
  8the sampling period (45.77%) followed by Gold (34.62%) and Energy (18.85%). The 
Diversified Resources sector, on the other hand, records only 2 IPOs in this time period.  
 
To test for our risk management hypothesis we develop two measures of risk 
management. The first proxy is a dummy variable equaling to unity if the company 
clearly states their intention to engage in a risk management program in the prospectus 
and zero otherwise. The second measure of risk management is also a dummy variable 
equaling to unity if the company reports the usage of financial derivatives to hedge 
commodity and exchange rate risks in the year following listing in their financial reports 
and zero otherwise.  As can be seen from Panel C of Table 2, 11.92% of firms stated that 
they would engage in a certain risk management program to alleviate the risk associating 
with fluctuations in commodity prices and exchange rates in the prospectus but only 
5.77% of firms actually use financial derivatives in the year following listing.
6 The low 
incidence of derivative usage by these newly listed firms is hardly surprising in light of 
hedging theories. Hedging in general exhibits economies of scale; hence larger firms are 
more likely to be engaged in derivative usage than smaller firms. Ang, Chua and 
McConnell (1982) and Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have provided empirical 
evidence that larger firms are more likely to have the financial and human capital 
required to coordinate a hedging program. Newly listed firms, on the contrary, are small 
in size. They are deterred by the cost of hedging and therefore are more likely to absorb 
financial risks than actively hedging them.  
 
For the purpose of testing the crowding out effect, we construct two indices that proxy for 
the strength of the Health and Pharmaceuticals and Telecommunication IPO markets. The 
first measure, RHPi is calculated as the average initial return on all IPOs taking place in 
the Health and Pharmaceuticals sector in the 12 months period prior to the listing date of 
a new resources issue. Similarly, RTELi is an index equal to the average initial return of all 
                                                 
6 On average, for those firms that use financial derivatives, the notional amount of derivative contracts 
outstanding as of reporting date is A$234,769.  
  9IPOs in the Telecommunication sector in the 12 month window preceding a new 
resources float.
7     
 
Finally, we construct a variable that measures the average underpricing of the resources 
IPOs in the 12 months period leading to a new float (RMINi) to test for the hot issue effect. 
Consistent with Derrien and Wormack (2003) we also use the market return 3 months 
prior to the float as a proxy to measure the extent to which the issue price of a new IPO 
adjusts to publicly available market return data. We use both the All Ordinaries Index and 
the ASX All Resources Index as measures of market return.  
 
Apart from the above variables that are central to this study, we also include in our 
regressions a number of control variables that have been established in the literature as 
having some impact on underpricing. These measures include: Size of the issue (LNTOT), 
issue price (ISSUEPRI), time to listing (TIMETOLIST), whether the issue is underwritten 
(UWRITTEN), whether the issue provides options to the underwriter (UOPTIONS), 
whether the issue comes with share options (SOPTIONS), whether the issuing company is  
limited liability or no liability (NL0LTD1), whether the issue employs an independent 
accounting firm (INDEPACC) and the market return for the period between the proposed 
date and listing date (MKTSENT). A detailed description of these variables as well as 
their predicted relationship with underpricing is provided in Table 1. Additionally, a 
Pearson correlation matrix of these variables is reported in Table 3.  
 
Following the convention established in the literature, we calculate underpricing 
(RETURN) as the closing price on the first day of listing divided by the issue price minus 
one. Our main regression models are specified below: 




                                                 
7 For the 1994 – 2004 period, 89 Health and Pharmaceuticals companies went public and the average 
underpricing return is 27.45%. For the same time period, 50 Telecommunications companies were floated 
and provided a 33.85% first day return to investors. To conserve space, we do not report these data in our 
tables.  
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where RETURN is underpricing return or first day initial return, RISKMAN is a dummy 
variable proxying for the firm proposed or actual risk management program, RHPi is an 
index measuring the average underpricing in the Health and Pharmaceuticals IPOs in the 
12 months period prior to the listing date of a particular resources IPO. RTELi is an index 
measuring the average underpricing in the 12 months period prior to the listing date of a 
particular resources IPO. RMINi is an index measuring the average underpricing in the 
resources IPOs in the 12 months period prior to the listing date of a particular resources 
IPO. MKTRET is the return of the market for the 3 months preceding the listing date. We 
use both the return on the All Ordinaries Index and the ASX All Resources Index as 
proxies for market return. Xi is a vector of the control variables whose descriptions are 
provided in Table 1. ω i εi are the error terms.  
 
3.  Results  
3.1 Resources IPOs and underpricing 
Consistent with the literature on IPOs, we find substantial evidence of underpricing in our 
sample. In particular, over the sampling period companies that went public suffered from 
an average underpricing level of 16.13%. The degree of underpricing is most severe in 
the Other Metals sector (21.41%) while Energy companies have on average a 
significantly lower level of underpricing (7.95%). Our evidence of underpricing, while 
slightly greater than the 13.3% initial return reported by Dimovski and Brooks (2006), is 
significantly lower than what has been documented in the past for resources IPOs. How 
(2000) reports an average underpricing of 107.8% for a sample of 130 IPOs during 1979-
1990 while Brailsford, Heaney and Shi (2001), in a broader sample from 1976–1997, 
show an underpricing level of 46.5% for 244 IPOs. It seems that the positive discrepancy 
in underpricing observed by Ritter (1984) between resources IPOs and other IPOs is 
gradually disappearing over time in the Australian market. In terms of the amount of 
capital sought, these IPOs in total raised A$5,024,100,472 and in the process left 
  11A$97,804,734.45, or approximately 1.95% of the capital sought, on the table. This 
number appears modest due to an outlying observation in which the company (Zinifex 
Ltd) sought to raise $1.3 billion dollars and experienced a first day return of -29.62%. 
Once this outlier has been accounted for, the money left on the table is in the vicinity of 
12.96% of the total amount of capital raised. In our sample, the best performing IPO, as 
far as the investors are concerned, returns a massive 545.5% on the first day of trading 
while the worst performing IPO leaves investors 37.5% worse off. Panel B of Table 1 
shows that on average the sample firms seek $19.31 millions by going public with an 
average issue price of 33.68 cents. It also appears that energy IPOs are priced more 
highly and take less time to list (61 days compared to 66 days on average). Finally, as 
noted in the preceding section, a number of issues (32.69% of all issues) are overpriced 
suggesting that the Rock’s (1986) winners’ curse does exist in the Australian resources 
IPO market in our sampling period.  
 
Panel C of Table 1 provides a more detailed picture of the resources IPO market. 
Approximately half of all floats are underwritten while 13.85% of issuing firms also 
provide options to the underwriters. Share options are offered in conjunction with 
subscription shares in 35.38% of the issues. Finally, 56.92% of the issuers have limited 
liability and 39.62% employ an independent accounting company.   
 
    3.2 Underpricing and Risk Management 
 
The results of Equation [1] that tests the relationship between underpricing and risk 
management are reported in Table 4. In general, both proposed risk management and 
actual risk management do not exhibit any statistically significant relationship with 
underpricing. While hedging has been shown to reduce the asymmetric information 
relating to managerial ability and firm value (Dadalt, Gay and Nam 2002) and to have the 
potential to enhance firm value (Allayannis and Weston 2001), the role of hedging does 
not seem to be priced in an IPO process. There are two possible interpretations of this 
result. First, hedging fails to alleviate information asymmetry relating to the value of the 
new issue for these newly listed firms despite contrary empirical evidence for more 
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relating to a new issue, however it is not perceived to be a sufficiently strong signal to 
reduce underpricing like other asymmetric information alleviating mechanisms, such as 
the utilization of an underwriter, are. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address 
these issues, we can conclude that in our current sample, there is no evidence that the 
employment of a risk management program is associated with a lower level of 
underpricing.  
 
The behaviour of control variables in general conforms to our expectations. Issue size and 
issue price have been used widely in the literature as a proxy for the degree of ex-ante 
uncertainty relating to the new issue (Beatty and Ritter 1986, Lee, Taylor and Walter 
1996). Larger issues and higher issues prices are hypothesized to be associated with a 
lower degree of ex ante uncertainty and as a result are expected to have a negative 
relationship with underpricing. Consistent with this contention, our results show that a 
higher issue price is associated with a lower first day return. The evidence, however, is 
absent in the case of issue size.  
 
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) argue that the fixed price issuing mechanism in Australia, 
coupled with a concealed share allocation procedure, exacerbates the winner’s curse 
problem faced by uninformed investors. To the extent that the issue price and the issue 
size can not be altered once the prospectus is released, the ‘uninformed’ investors have 
no opportunity to lessen the information heterogeneity inherent between them and the 
more informationally privileged investors. As a result, ‘good’ issues are quickly 
subscribed to by institutional investors while ‘not so good’ issues take longer to list and 
may be  more likely to be allocated to individual investors. The time to listing can, 
therefore, be a measure of the extent to which the winner’s curse takes place and the 
associating level of underpricing. Generally, the longer the time it takes for a firm to list 
the less institutional demand there is and the lower the degree of underpricing. This 
prediction is largely consistent with findings in ‘hot’ issue markets that underpricing 
tends to be larger in IPOs that are subscribed to more quickly. Our results provide strong 
support to the existence of the winner’s curse phenomenon. In particular, IPOs that 
  13experience more delay are associated with less underpricing. In terms of economic 
significance, for every day that the IPO is delayed the average underpricing return 
reduces by 0.16%.  
 
Using both the return on the All Ordinaries Index and the ASX All Resources Index for 
the period between the proposal date and the listing date as a proxy for the market 
sentiment, we find strong evidence that the initial day return on IPOs reflect market 
sentiment. In particular, higher underpricing is observed in response to a period of strong 
market performance. Finally, consistent with Dimovski and Brooks (2006), we find 
evidence that the use of share options as an incentive for the underwriter can curb 
underpricing. Dimovski and Brooks (2006) report underwriters’ options as one of the 
most important explanatory variables for underpricing.  
 
    3.3 Crowding out and hot issue effects  
 
To test for the hot issue effect and the degree to which recent market return is 
incorporated into the issue price of IPOs, we regress underpricing on two measures of 
market return being the return on the All Ordinaries Index in the 3 month period leading 
up to the listing date and the return on the ASX All Resources Index in the 3 month 
period prior to listing. The 3 month window is chosen in light of Derrien and Wormack’s 
(2003) finding that the 3 month market return has a significant impact on the extent of 
underpricing. The results of these regressions are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 5. As can be seen from Table 5, the coefficients on these recent market return 
variables are most significant both statistically and economically. Our result lends further 
support to previous studies that show that IPO price adjusts to public information in the 
case of Australia as well as private information in the case of the US. The time to listing 
and the share options offered to underwriters continue to be significant factors explaining 
underpricing.  
 
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 we present the results of our tests  for both the hot 
issue effect and the crowding out effect by including the RHPi, RTELi and RMINi variables in 
  14the regressions. Our results in general do not support the crowding out hypothesis as the 
returns in the Health and Pharmaceuticals and Telecommunication IPOs do not portray 
any relationship with the extent of underpricing in the resources IPOs. Our findings 
indicate that the market for IPOs is segmented and there is a distinctive clientele for 
resources IPOs who make their investment decisions independently of alternative IPO 
investment opportunities. Evidence of a hot issue effect, on the other hand, appears 
robust. Using an index that measures the average return of IPOs that took place 12 
months prior to the listing date of a new issue, we find that this RMINi variable is 
positively related to underpricing. In an information extraction framework, the issue price 
adjusts to public information including market returns and the returns of prior resources 
IPOs. Our finding confirms the serial correlation between initial returns that are often 
observed in a hot issue market.  
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
  This paper investigates 260 resources IPOs in Australia between 1994 and 2004. 
Equipped with the most exhaustive sample of resources IPOs that has ever been utilized 
in the Australia resources IPO literature, we provide evidence of underpricing which, at 
16.13%, is more modest than what has been reported in the past except for Dimovski and 
Brooks (2006) which reports a 13.3% underpricing.  
 
More importantly, we develop and empirically test for alternative theories that aim to 
explain underpricing. In particular, we empirically test for the role of risk management in 
alleviating the degree of information asymmetry relating to the value of the issuing firm 
and hence in lowering the underpricing return. Nevertheless we fail to document such a 
relationship. Second, we show that the market for resources IPOs is segmented and the 
demand for resources IPOs does not seem to be crowded out by the availability of IPOs 
in other industry sectors. Finally, we provide strong evidence of the hot issue effect 
where the issue price adjusts in response to the market return and the initial return of 
previous IPOs that successfully list on the market.   
  15 
  16References 
Allayannis, G. and Weston, J. 2001, ‘The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm 
market value’, Review of Financial Studies, 14, 243-276. 
 
Allen, F., Faulhaber, G., 1989. Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 23, 303–324. 
 
Ang, J. S., Chua, J. H. McConnell, J. J. 1982. The administrative costs of corporate 
bankruptcy: A note', Journal of Finance, 37, 219-226. 
 
Beatty, R., 1989. Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings, 
Accounting Review, 64, 693–709. 
 
Beatty, R., Ritter, J., 1986. Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial 
public offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 213–232. 
 
Benveniste, L., Spindt, P., 1989. How investment bankers determine the offer price and 
allocation of new issues, Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 343–362. 
 
Bradley, D., Cooney, J., Dolvin, S., Jordan, B., 2006, Penny stock IPOs, Financial 
Management, 35, 5–29. 
 
Brailsford, T., Heaney, R., Shi, J., 2001. The cyclical behaviour of the IPO market in 
Australia, Accounting Research  Journal, 14, 17–34. 
 
Carter, R., Manaster, S., 1990. Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation, Journal 
of Finance, 45, 1045–1067. 
 
Chalk, A., Peavy, J., 1987. Initial public offerings: daily returns, offering types and the 
price effect, Financial Analysts Journal, 43, 65–69. 
 
Corwin, S., Schultz, P., 2005. The role of underwriting syndicates: pricing, information 
production and underwriter competition, Journal of Finance 60, 443–486. 
 
Dadalt, P. Gay, G., Nam, J. 2002. Asymmetric Information and Corporate Use of 
Derivatives’, Journal of Futures Markets, 22, 241-267.  
 
Derrien, F. 2005. IPO Pricing in “hot” market conditions: Who leaves money on the 
table?, Journal of Finance, 60, 487-521. 
 
Derrien, F. Womack, K. 2003. Auction vs. Book building and the control of underpricing 
in hot IPO markets, Review of Financial Studies, 16, 31-61. 
 
Dimovski, W., Brooks, R., 2004. Initial public offerings in Australia 1994 to 1999: recent 
evidence of underpricing and underperformance, Review of Quantitative Finance 
Accounting, 22, 179–198. 
  17Dimovski, W, Brooks, R. 2006.The underpricing of gold mining initial public offerings, 
Research in International Business and Finance, doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2006.11.002 
 
Dunbar, C., 1995. The use of warrants as underwriter compensation in initial public 
offerings, Journal of Financial Economics. 38, 59–78. 
 
Finn, F., Higham, R., 1988. The performance of unseasoned new equity issues-cum stock 
exchange listings in Australia, Journal of Banking and Finance, 12, 333–351. 
 
How, J., 2000. The initial and long run performances of mining IPOs in Australia, 
Australian Journal of Management, 25, 95–118. 
 
How, J., Howe, J., 2001. Warrants in initial public offerings: empirical evidence. Journal 
of Business, 74, 433–458. 
 
How, J., Izan, H., Monroe, G., 1995, Differential information and the underpricing of 
initial public offerings: Australian evidence, Accounting and Finance, 35, 87–105. 
 
Ibbotson, R., 1975. Price performance of common stock new issues, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2, 235–272. 
 
Ibbotson, R. Jaffe, J. 1975. “Hot issue” markets, Journal of Finance, 30, 1027-1042. 
 
Ibbotson, R., Sindelar, J., Ritter, J., 1994. The market’s problems with the pricing of 
initial public offerings, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7, 66–74. 
 
Koop, G., Li, K., 2001. The valuation of IPO and SEO firms, Journal of Empirical 
Finance 8, 375–401. 
 
Lee, P., Taylor, S.,Walter, T., 1996. Australian IPO pricing in the short and long run. 
Journal of Banking Finance 20, 1189–1210. 
 
Loughran, T. Ritter, J. 2002. Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving money on the 
table in IPOs?, Review of Financial Studies, 15, 413-443. 
 
Loughran, T. Ritter, J. Rydqvist, K. 1994. Initial Public Offerings: International insights, 
Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 2, 165-199. 
 
Maslen, G. 2006. In the wake of the book, About the House Magazine, 24-27. 
 
Michaely, R., Shaw, W., 1994. The pricing of initial public offerings: tests of adverse-
selection and signaling theories, Review of Financial Studies. 7, 279–319. 
 
Nance, D., Smith, C. W. Smithson, C. W. 1993, On the determinants of corporate 
hedging, Journal of Finance, 48, 267-284. 
 
  18Ritter, J., 1984. The “hot issue” market of 1980, Journal of Business 57, 215–240. 
 
Ritter, J., 1987. The costs of going public, Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 269–281. 
 
Rock, K., 1986. Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 
187–212. 
 
Schultz, P., 1993. Unit initial public offerings: a form of staged financing, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 34, 199–229. 
 
Schenone, C., 2004. The effect of banking relationships on the firm’s underpricing, 
Journal of Finance 54, 2903–2958. 
 
Welch, I. 1992. Sequential sales, learning and cascades, Journal of Finance, 47, 695-732. 
  19Table 1 – Variable Description 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Description Previous  Studies 
RETURN    The return to the subscribers on the first day of listing 
calculated as the closing price on the first day of trading 
divided by the issue price minus one 
 
RISKMAN  -  A dummy variable equaling to unity if the issuing company 
proposes a risk management program in the prospectus or 
actually uses financial derivatives in the year following 
listing or zero otherwise 
None to our knowledge 
RHPi ?  The average underpricing in the Health and Pharmaceuticals 
IPOs in the 12 months period prior to the listing date of a 
particular resources IPO 
None to our knowledge 
RTELi ?  The average underpricing in the 12 months period prior to 
the listing date of a particular resources IPO 
None to our knowledge 
RMINi +  The average underpricing in the resources IPOs in the 12 
months period prior to the listing date of a particular 
resources IPO 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) 
Ritter (1985) 
LNTOT  -  The size of the issue calculated as the issue prices times by 
the number of shares offered 
Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) 
How (2000) 
ISSUEPRI  -  The issue price at which the public are invited to subscribe 
to shares  
Chalk and Peavy (1987) 
Ibbotson et al (1994) 
TIMETOLIST  -  The time period between the proposed date to the listing 
date 
Lee, Taylor and Walter 
(1996) 
UWRITTEN  -  A dummy variable equaling to unity if the issue is 
guaranteed by an underwriter and zero otherwise 
Carter and Manaster 
(1990) 
UOPTIONS  -  A dummy variable equaling to unity if the share options are 
available to the underwriter and zero otherwise 
Dunbar (1995) 
Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) 
SOPTIONS  -  A dummy variable equaling to unity if share options are 
offered to subscribers and zero otherwise 
How and Howe (2001) 
Schultz (1993) 
NL0LTD1    A dummy variable equaling to unity if the company is  
limited liability and zero if no liability  
Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) 
INDEACC  -  A dummy variable equaling to unity if the issue has an 
independent auditor 
Beatty (1989) 
MKTSENT  +  The return on the All Ordinaries Index for the period 
between the proposed date and listing date 
Dimovski and Brooks 
(2006) 
RESSENT  +  The return on the ASX All Resources Index for the period 
between the proposed date and the listing date 
Dimovski and Brooks 
(2006) 
ALLORDS  +  The return on the All Ordinaries Index for the 3 months 
preceding the listing date 
Derrien and Womack 
(2003) 
ASXRES  +  The return on the ASX All Resources Index for the 3 months 
preceding the listing date 
None to our knowledge 
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Table 2 - The prevalence and characteristics of resources IPOs in Australia 1994 – 2004 
 
Panel A: Resources IPOs in Australia 1994 - 2004 
  Gold  Other Metals  Diversified Resources  Energy  Total 
1994 19  6  0  2  27 
1995 5  1  0  3  9 
1996 18  7  1  2  28 
1997 11  6  0  8  25 
1998 0  1  0  3  4 
1999 0  1  0  1  2 
2000 3  10  0  2  15 
2001 1  12  0  4  17 
2002 10  17  0  4  31 
2003 11  26  0  3  40 
2004 12  32  1  17  62 
Total 90  119  2  49  260 
% of total  34.62  45.77  0.77  18.85  100.00 
Panel B: Characteristics of Resources IPOs in Australia - Continuous Variables 
  Gold (n=90)  Other Metals (n=119)  Diversified Resources (n=2)  Energy (n=49)  Total (n=260) 
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Underpricing Return (%)  0.1380  0.0500  0.2141 0.0500  0.0735  0.0735  0.0795 0.0250  0.1613  0.0500 
Money Left to Subscribers 
($'000) 1,980.77  200.00  -1,822.96  218.75  31,276.16 31,276.16  1,508.48 300.00  376.17 226.28 
Amount Sought ($mil)  17.62  5.00  18.34 4.00  141.00  141.00  19.84  7.50  19.31  5.00 
Issue Price   0.309444  0.2  0.293361  0.2 1.35  1.35  0.45102  0.2 0.336769  0.2 
Time to listing (days)  68.63333  58  67.14286  60  53  53  61.30612  54  66.45  58 
Panel C: Characteristics of Resources IPOs in Australia - Dummy Variables 
  Gold (n=90)  Other Metals (n=119)  Diversified Resources (n=2)  Energy (n=49)  Total (n=260) 
 Number  %  Number  %  Number  %  Number  %  Number  % 
Proposed Risk Management   12  13.33 10  8.40 0  0.00 9  18.37  31  11.92 
Actual Risk Management   5  5.56 5  4.20  0 0.00  5  10.20  15  5.77 
Underwritten   57  63.33  49  41.18  0  0.00  30  61.22  136  52.31 
Underwriters' options   12  13.33 15  12.61  0  0.00 9  18.37  36  13.85 
Share options   40  44.44  35  29.41  0  0.00  17  34.69  92  35.38 
Limited Liability   37  41.11  80  67.23  2  100.00  29  59.18  148  56.92 
Independent Accounting   38  42.22 37  31.09  2 100.00  26  53.06  103  39.62 
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Table 3 - Pearson Correlation Matrix Between Explanatory Variables 
                          
    INDEPACC  ISSUEPRI  LNTOT MKTSENTI NL0LTD1 RISKMAN  RT_HP RT_TEL  RTMINING  SOPTIONS  TIMETOLIST  UOPTIONS  UWRITTEN 
INDEPACC  1.0000                     
ISSUEPRI 0.3062  1.0000                      
LNTOT 0.0102  -0.0476  1.0000                     
MKTSENTI -0.1725 0.1338  0.1377  1.0000                   
NL0LTD1 0.0640  0.1626  0.0389  -0.0942  1.0000                 
RISKMAN 0.1533  0.5620  -0.0079  0.0876  0.0674  1.0000               
RTBIOTECH -0.0910  -0.0386 0.1595  0.2021  0.0573  0.0409  1.0000             
RTDOTCOM -0.0607  0.1324 0.2107  0.2758  0.1288  0.1150  0.6548  1.0000           
RTMINING -0.0260 0.0529  0.1956  0.0886 -0.1165  -0.0392 -0.1095  0.1812  1.0000         
SOPTIONS -0.1428  -0.2289  -0.0267  -0.1470  -0.0289  -0.1949 0.0541  0.0096  -0.1100  1.0000       
TIMETOLIST -0.2140  -0.1993 -0.1169 -0.0467  -0.2340  -0.1672  -0.1587  -0.2776  0.0094  0.1138  1.0000     
UOPTIONS 0.0550 -0.0947  0.1857  0.0506  -0.2284  -0.1741 0.2853  0.2415  0.0100  0.0187  0.0347  1.0000   
UWRITTEN 0.1256  0.0476  -0.0538  -0.2251  -0.1606  -0.0800  0.1310  0.2281  0.0634  -0.0399  -0.1712  0.3877  1.0000 
                      
                      
 INDEPACC  ISSUEPRI  LNTOT  RESSENT  NL0LTD1 RISKMAN RTBIOTECH RTDOTCOM RTMINING SHOPTIONS  TIMETOLIST UOPTIONS UWRITTEN 
INDEPACC 1.0000                         
ISSUEPRI 0.3062  1.0000                      
LNTOT 0.0102  -0.0476  1.0000                     
RESSENT -0.0372  0.0032  -0.0060  1.0000                   
NL0LTD1 0.0640  0.1626  0.0389  0.0448  1.0000                 
RISKMAN 0.1533  0.5620  -0.0079  0.0392  0.0674  1.0000               
RTBIOTECH -0.0910  -0.0386 0.1595  0.0215  0.0573  0.0409  1.0000             
RTDOTCOM -0.0607  0.1324 0.2107 -0.0189  0.1288  0.1150  0.6548  1.0000           
RTMINING -0.0260 0.0529  0.1956  0.0648 -0.1165  -0.0392 -0.1095  0.1812  1.0000         
SHOPTIONS -0.1428  -0.2289  -0.0267 0.0656  -0.0289 -0.1949  0.0541  0.0096  -0.1100  1.0000       
TIMETOLIST -0.2140  -0.1993 -0.1169 -0.0570  -0.2340  -0.1672  -0.1587  -0.2776  0.0094  0.1138  1.0000     
UOPTIONS 0.0550 -0.0947  0.1857  -0.1064  -0.2284  -0.1741 0.2853  0.2415  0.0100  0.0187  0.0347  1.0000   




  22Table 4 - Underpricing and Risk Management 
 
 
This table reports the result of the following equation 




where RETURN is the underpricing return or first day initial return, RISKMAN is a dummy variable equaling to unity if 
the firm proposes to employ a risk management program in its prospectus or actually employ financial derivatives in 
the year following listing. Xi is a vector of the control variables. The description of these variables is provided in Table 
1. t-stats are in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.6623  0.7038*  0.6823  0.6326 
  (1.6824) (1.7937) (1.6016) (1.3584) 
PROPOSED RISKMAN  0.0358  0.0477     
 (0.4780)  (0.6356)     
ACTUAL RISKMAN      0.0511  0.0184 
     (0.4398)  (0.2325) 
LNTOT  -0.0231 -0.0216 -0.0229 -0.0191 
  (-1.0497) (-1.0042) (-0.9420) (-0.6805) 
ISSUEPRI  -0.1597** -0.1485** -0.2731** -0.2422** 
  (-2.148) (-1.9265) (-2.358) (-2.0984) 
SOPTIONS  -0.0534 -0.0730 -0.0526 -0.0677 
  (-0.7895) (-1.1199) (-0.6917) (-0.9677) 
UWRITTEN  0.1116 0.0859 0.1093 0.0962 
  (1.4886) (1.0397) (0.9972) (0.8306) 
TIMETOLIST -0.0017**  -0.0016*  -0.0012  -0.0011 
 (-2.1064)  (-1.75)  (-1.1619)  (-0.8121) 
MKTSENT 2.1224***    1.7373**   
  (3.9121)  (2.3532)  
RESSENT   0.8322***    0.5223 
   (3.1930)   (1.355) 
UOPTIONS -0.1805**  -0.1395  -0.1406  -0.1213 
  (-2.0809) (-1.4920) (-1.0181) (-0.7105) 
NL0LTD1  -0.0633 -0.0782 -0.1147 -0.1294 
  (-0.9038)  (-1.0497) (-0.822) (-1.0346) 
INDEPACC  0.0506 0.0571 0.1833 0.1856 
  (0.5681) (0.5354) (1.4145) (1.3802) 
      
Adjusted  R-squared  0.0187 0.0030 0.0212 0.0239 
 
*   significant at the 10% level 
**  significant at the 5% level 
***  significant at the 1% level  
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This table reports the results of the following equations: 
] 2 [
1
3 2 1 0 i
n
j
i j MINi TELi HPi i X R R R RETURN ε β β β β β + + + + + = ∑
=
 
RETURNi = χ0 + χ1MKTRETi + χ j Xi
j=1
n
∑ +εi [3] 
where RETURN is underpricing return or first day initial return, RISKMAN is a dummy variable proxying for 
the firm proposed or actual risk management program, RHPi is an index measuring the average underpricing in 
the Health and Pharmaceuticals IPOs in the 12 months period prior to the listing date of a particular resources 
IPO. RTELi is an index measuring the average underpricing in the 12 months period prior to the listing date of a 
particular resources IPO. RMINi is an index measuring the average underpricing in the resources IPOs in the 12 
months period prior to the listing date of a particular resources IPO. ALLORDS is the return of the All 
Ordinaries Index for the 3 months preceding the listing date. ASXRES is the return of the ASX All Resources 
Index for the 3 months preceding the listing date. Xi is a vector of the control variables. The description of 
these variables is provided in Table 1. t-stats are in parentheses.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C  0.6758* 0.6606* 0.8138*  0.8885** 
  (1.7321) (1.7011) (1.8804) (2.0589) 
ALLORDS - 3  1.7328***       
 (3.6784)       
ASXRES - 3    0.8139***     
   (2.6101)     
RTMINING     0.5882**  0.8932*** 
     (2.4074)  (3.0004) 
RTDOTCOM     -0.2375  -0.2187 
     (-1.4033)  (-0.3888) 
RTBIOTECH     0.0572  0.0688 
     (0.6426)  (0.5610) 
LNTOT  -0.0268 -0.0247 -0.0467  -0.0517* 
  (-1.2181) (-1.1662) (-1.6535) (-1.8461) 
ISSUEPRI -0.1352*  -0.1247*  -0.0458  -0.0316 
  (-1.8158) (-1.7021) (-0.8510) (0.0429) 
SHOPTIONS -0.0605  -0.0736  0.0523  0.0265 
 (-0.8957)  (-1.0668)  (0.9479)  (0.3419) 
UWRITTEN  0.0999 0.0835 0.0017 -0.0363 
  (1.3804) (1.1874) (0.0237) (-0.9351) 
TIMETOLIST -0.0013*  -0.0013*  -0.0014**  -0.0015** 
  (-1.6901) (-1.7463) (-2.0819) (-2.1888) 
MKTSENTI/RESSENT     1.9159***  0.8446** 
     (3.0831)  (2.2023) 
UOPTIONS -0.1677**  -0.1325  0.0057  0.0346 
 (-1.9993)  (-1.6785)  (0.0731)  (0.4277) 
NL0LTD1 -0.0609  -0.0839  0.0564  0.0368 
 (-0.8684)  (-1.1994)  (0.9177)  (0.2059) 
INDEPACC 0.0604  0.0657  -0.0011  -0.0125 
 (0.6843)  (0.7624)  (-0.0211)  (-0.5938) 
        
Adjusted  R-squared  0.0527 0.0441 0.0577 0.0046 
 
*   significant at the 10% level 
**  significant at the 5% level 
***  significant at the 1% level  
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